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 Repression, Rivalry and Racketeering in the Creation of Franco’s Spain: the curious case of 
Emilio Griffiths 
 
‘These things happened. That’s the thing to keep one’s eye on. They happened even though 
Lord Halifax said they happened […] and they did not happen any less because the Daily 
Telegraph has suddenly found out about them when it is five years too late’.1 (George Orwell) 
 
In mid-November 1936, a Gibraltarian named Abraham Bensusan wrote two letters to the 
British Secretary of State for the Colonies in London. His subject was the Spanish Civil War, 
which had, by then, already been raging for three months. Bensusan described how deeply the 
war in Spain had affected ‘The Rock’. In both letters he hinted darkly at the ‘fascist’ elements 
in Gibraltar and potentially suspect loyalties amongst the civilian population.2 But his principal 
aim was to highlight the appalling atrocities being committed by the military rebels in the 
surrounding region of Spain, the Campo de Gibraltar. Bensusan alleged that civilians, including 
Gibraltarians, were under threat of arrest or execution in the Campo, often for the most trivial 
offences, such as carrying a pair of shoes in a ‘communist’ newspaper. In the first letter, having 
urged that ‘England should formulate a formal protest to the authorities of La Linea… and 
specially protect Gibraltarians’, Bensusan singled out one man as responsible for the repression 
in the neighbouring Spanish towns: 
 
‘I am told that a man called Griffith born in Gibraltar is Chief of Falange Española (Fascists) 
at La Linea, this young man apparently seems to be the murderer over at La Linea […]’ 
 
Bensusan returned to his theme in a second letter, four days later. He alleged further executions 
– one man a tailor who had been found with red ties in his stock – and suggested that even 
Gibraltarians were being ‘fichado’ (marked) by the new Spanish authorities in the Campo. 
Again, Bensusan singled-out one man as responsible: 
 
                                                     
1 George Orwell, ‘Looking back on the Spanish War’, in Peter Davison (ed.), Orwell in Spain (London: 
Penguin, 2001), pp. 343-364. 
2 The National Archives/Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), CO 91/500/3. Abraham Bensusan to 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 November 1936; 20 November 1936. Spelling and grammatical 
mistakes appear in the original and have been retained in the quotations that follow. 
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‘If anyone is caught reading the “Porvenir” he is noted by Griffins or Griffith’s spies in 
Gibraltar, he is a communist and is “fichado” and if he goes to Linea the murderer Emilio 
Griffin or Griffiths has the man or woman shot without trial […] the other day the murderer 
Griffin of La Linea shot seven without trial, as you saw in the Gibraltar Chronicle, he 
deliberately came to Gibraltar, and I saw him, in Main Street talking to Mr Gulloch, Chief of 
Police of Gibraltar, and he went back again to Linea at his pleasure… Griffin is the murderer. 
He has spies in Gibraltar, some Gibraltarians, some Spaniards or anybody who hates another 
in Gibraltar for the sake of competition […] YOU SHOULD SHOOT THE MURDERER 
GRIFFIN. I AM SO SURE AND TRANQUIL OF THE JUSTICE IN THIS, THAT I OFFER 
MYSELF TO FORM PART AS ONE OF THE SHOOTING PARTY. I WOULD HAVE NO 
REMORSE.’ 
 
As we will see below, Emilio Griffiths escaped the wrath of Abraham Bensusan, and indeed 
avoided any official protest on the part of the British government against the treatment of 
British subjects in the Campo. Griffiths did meet a very violent end, however. On 6 May 1937, 
he was arrested by Francoist security forces in La Línea and taken to prison in Seville to await 
trial. Before any judicial proceedings were started, it was reported that Emilio Griffiths had 
died on 24 June 1937 ‘in an attempt to escape arrest’, after falling from the fifth storey window 
of a military building in the city.3 
 
The curious, not to say mysterious case of Emilio Griffiths is but one of thousands of 
compelling individual stories from the Spanish Civil War. Thanks to a burgeoning and 
increasingly diverse historiography of the conflict, and thanks in no small part to the tireless 
efforts of local historians and ‘memory’ groups to recover personal and local histories of the 
war, it is now commonplace to see fruitful dialogue between the personal and the general 
experience of the civil war.4 Indeed, this dialogue has enabled us to see the Spanish Civil War 
in its (more realistic) complexity; if not necessarily achieving the lofty aim of total ‘detachment’ 
and ‘objectivity’, then certainly moving beyond tired historiographical binaries to develop our 
                                                     
3 Gibraltar Chronicle, 25 June 1937. No trial record exists for Griffiths in the Archivo del Tribunal 
Militar Territorial Segundo in Seville. 
4 Extremely useful to the present work, for example, were two volumes of ‘micro-biographies’ of 
Republican mayors in Cádiz province. Santiago Moreno Tello (ed.), La destrucción de la Democracia: 
Vida y muerte de los alcaldes del Frente Popular en la provincial de Cádiz, 2 vols. (Cádiz: Diputación 
de Cádiz, 2011-2012). Oral history, biography and micro-biography have long pedigree in the 
historiography of the Spanish Civil War. Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain (London: Pimlico, 5th ed., 
1994), remains a classic of the first genre. Paul Preston, Comrades: Portraits from the Spanish Civil 
War (London: HarperCollins, 1999) is an influential example of the latter. 
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understanding of the conflict further.5 Griffiths’ case is certainly interesting, in and of itself, for 
the historian of the Spanish Civil War, but in following his story we can also shed light into 
several areas of historiographical interest. 
 
First, Griffiths speaks to continuing interest in Britain’s role in the Spanish Civil War.6 Not 
only does his conduct once again raise question marks over Britain’s purported impartiality in 
the conflict, it also highlights specifically the way that British policy operated ‘on the ground’, 
that is to say in the British colony and fortress of Gibraltar.7 More teasingly, particularly for 
those prone to looking for historical conspiracy theories, the Griffiths case once again hints 
towards the possibility that British intelligence agencies were engaged with Spain’s military 
rebels from the outset.8 As we shall see, Emilio Griffiths was accused of being a British spy. 
 
The second area where Griffiths illuminates broader historiographical enquiries is in reminding 
us that the rebel coalition was prone to similar tensions and divisions as those that befell the 
defenders of the Spanish Republic.9 It has become something of a commonplace to read that 
Franco’s coalition held firmly to its purpose, while the Republic’s defeat can be explained in 
no small measure by political divisions between republicans, socialists, anarchists, communists 
and so-forth.10 Griffiths’ brief career in the Campo de Gibraltar and his subsequent demise 
                                                     
5 For a coruscating critique of those claiming ‘objectivity’, see Chris Ealham, ‘The Emperor’s New 
Clothes: “Objectivity” and Revisionism in Spanish History’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 48, 
no. 1 (2012), pp. 191-202. A recent, outstanding example of a supposedly ‘left-liberal’ scholar 
problematizing formerly cozy assumptions about the Republic is Maria Thomas, The Faith and the 
Fury: Popular Anticlerical Violence and Iconoclasm in Spain (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 
2012). 
6 See, for example, Tom Buchanan, Britain and the Spanish Civil War (Cambridge: CUP, 1997). 
7 Enrique Moradiellos, La perfidia de Albión: el gobierno británico y la guerra civil española (Madrid: 
Siglo XXI, 1996). On Gibraltar see Gareth Stockey, Gibraltar: a Dagger in the Spine of Spain? 
(Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2008), pp. 64-136; Julio Ponce, Gibraltar and the Spanish Civil 
War (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
8 See for example, Peter Day, Franco’s Friends: How British Intelligence Helped Bring Franco to 
Power in Spain (London: Biteback Publishing, 2012). 
9 The obvious personal and ideological tensions have long-since been recognized in several studies. 
See, inter alia, Sheelagh Ellwood, Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era (London: Palgrave, 1988); 
Stanley Payne, The Franco Regime, 1936-1975 (London: Phoenix Press, 2000). For Franco’s ability to 
play off competing factions, see Paul Preston, Franco: a Biography (London: HarperCollins, 1993). 
10 This theme runs writ large through Michael Seidman, The Victorious Counterrevolution: the 
Nationalist Effort in the Spanish Civil War (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2011). 
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reminds us that the rebel coalition faced its own rivalries and competing priorities. This was 
true both on a ‘national’ and a local level. 
 
Despite numerous problems with the testimony of Abraham Bensusan, as we shall see, Griffiths 
was indeed a key figure in the rebel repression in the Campo. And so a third historiographical 
contribution is made by this personal history. Griffiths’ case certainly adds weight to a growing 
body of literature on the nature and causes of repression in the Francoist South.11 But it also 
provides further demonstration that the personal and the local are often just as important for 
understanding the repression as the political and the ideological. More broadly, Griffiths’ case 
contributes decisively to our understanding of the role and the rule of one of the most infamous 
personalities from the Spanish Civil War, General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano. Historians have 
long-since recognised the brutality of Queipo’s ‘justice’; indeed his desire to punish perceived 
enemies of the rebel coup was self-publicised in gory nightly radio broadcasts from Seville 
from the very first days of the war.12 Recently, however, the ‘Radio General’ has been recast 
as an enlightened and forward-thinking ruler of Seville, whose pathfinding economic policies 
would be copied throughout rebel Spain with great success.13 Such arguments are convincingly 
rebutted by the work of Rúben Serém, who has not only confirmed the scale of Queipo’s 
physical repression of the so-called ‘anti-Spain’, but has pointed to the importance of theft, 
intimidation and extortion in funding the rebel war economy. Emilio Griffiths’ brief tenure in 
the Campo de Gibraltar offers us an illuminating case study of Queipo’s ‘kleptocratic state’ in 
action.14 
 
Problematic sources 
                                                     
11 See, for example, Francisco Espinosa, La Columna de la Muerte (Barcelona: Crítica, 2003); Miguel 
Ángel del Arco Blanco, El primer franquismo en Andalucía Oriental, 1936-1951 (Granada: 
Universidad de Granada, 2005); Francisco Moreno Gómez, 1936: el genocidio franquista en Córdoba 
(Barcelona: Planeta, 2008). 
12 Ian Gibson, Queipo de Llano: Sevilla, verano de 1936 (Madrid: Grijalbo, 1986); Antonio 
Bahamonde, Un año con Queipo: memorias de una nacionalista (Sevilla: Espuela de Plata, 2nd. ed., 
2005). 
13 Seidman, Victorious Counterrevolution, pp. 78-155. 
14 Rúben Serém, ‘Conspiracy, coup d’état and civil war in Seville (1936-1939): History and myth in 
Francoist Spain,’ Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 2012. See especially, pp. 162-206. 
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By the time that Bensusan’s letters arrived in London, the British government was not lacking 
in reports of the most appalling atrocities taking place in rebel Spain, including in the Campo, 
nor that that many British subjects had been victims of rebel violence. Even so, the allegation 
that an individual born in Gibraltar was responsible for executions in the neighbouring town, 
and that British subjects inside Gibraltar were under threat, might have been expected to pique 
the interest of the Secretary of State, William Ormsby-Gore. Instead, he remained distinctly 
uninterested. Ormsby-Gore simply instructed Gibraltar’s Colonial Secretary, Colonel Beattie, 
that in future any letters from Gibraltarians should be forwarded to London through him.15 
 
Unlike Ormsby-Gore, Colonel Beattie was already aware that Bensusan had a history of mental 
illness, and had spent time in medical institutions in Gibraltar, Spain and Britain.16 Bensusan 
had tried to contact the Colonial Office a year earlier ‘to look for some work for him “in boxing” 
so that he can come to London’. 17  Gibraltar’s Governor, General Sir Charles Harington, 
commented that ‘[Bensusan] imagines himself to be “the licensed heavyweight champion of 
Gibraltar” but in actual fact he has been singularly unsuccessful in the few occasions on which 
he has appeared in the ring’.18 It might be tempting, therefore, to dismiss the letters of Bensusan 
as the ravings of a madman, or at the very least those of a fiercely emotional partisan.19 If 
feelings were running high throughout the world in response to the Spanish Civil War, in 
Gibraltar such political and social tensions were particularly acute.20 
 
A similar denunciation of British insouciance in the face of rebel atrocities, and similar warning 
as to the political loyalties of certain locals, had been sent from the colony in October 1936 by 
                                                     
15 PRO, CO 91/500/3. Ormsby-Gore to Colonial Secretary (Gibraltar), 4 December 1936. 
16 PRO, CO 91/498/10. Colonial Secretary (Gibraltar) to Arthur Dawe, 19 July 1935. 
17 PRO, CO 91/498/10. Colonial Secretary (Gibraltar) to Arthur Dawe, 19 July 1935. 
18 PRO, CO 91/498/10. Harington to Arthur Dawe, 24 August 1935. 
19 The letters have nonetheless been used in two published works in Spain. See Juan José Téllez, 
Gibraltar en los tiempos de los espias (Sevilla: Andalucía abierta, 2005), pp. 121-122; Ponce, 
Gibraltar, pp. 58-59. 
20 Stockey, Dagger, pp. 88-110. 
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Agustin Huart, a local trade union leader. Huart too claimed that ‘prominent Gibraltarians’ were 
spying on British citizens for the neighbouring rebel authorities: 
 
‘The rebels across the frontier are thus very familiar with the names of all British newspaper 
correspondents so much so that the “Daily Herald” correspondent Mr Stephen Wall appears 
first in the black list […] for a possible dose of castor oil or shooting by accident, by accident 
is the term used by the rebels for the shooting of any British subject.’ 
 
Huart himself had been ‘quietly informed and warned’ not to travel into rebel Spain. Having 
singled out two prominent Gibraltarians, Lionel and Joseph Imossi, as working on behalf of the 
rebels in numerous capacities and travelling regularly to La Línea and Algeciras, Huart noted: 
 
‘[…] the return of those visits by a Mr. Emilio Griffiths the Dictator of the Neighbourhood and 
the Chief Governmental Delegate in Andalusia appointed by ex-General Queipo de Llano can 
also be seen practically daily coming into Gibraltar […] it is simply scandalous.’21 
 
Like Bensusan, Huart hardly stands as the most reliable source by conventional historical 
standards. Huart was fiercely and unashamedly partisan on behalf of the Second Republic, at 
one stage appearing in a Republican newspaper on the front lines of battle with a revolver in 
his hand.22 Unlike many on the Gibraltar left, his commitment to Spanish republican refugees, 
who had fled to the Rock after July 1936, as well as his bitter opposition to the Franco regime, 
remained unwavering, even into the 1950s.23  Nonetheless, whilst clearly problematic, both 
sources can be corroborated against other evidence. Bensusan was correct in stating that the 
Gibraltar Chronicle reported seven executions in La Línea on 15 November 1936. In Huart’s 
letter, he alleged that the Governor himself was providing sanctuary ‘in Government House 
[for] a family of Right Wing refugees named Castillo [sic]’. The memoirs of the Spanish 
psychiatrist Carlos Castilla del Pino, born in San Roque, describe this stay with Governor 
Harington at length.24  In a similar way, the description that both sources offer of Emilio 
                                                     
21 Agustin Huart to Ernest Bevin, 9 October 1936. Transport and General Workers’ Union Archive, 
Modern Records Centre, Warwick. MSS. 126/TG/3/Sacks 96, 103, 134. 
22 PRO, CO 91/505/5. Memorandum on proposed talk of Agustin Huart, Colonial Secretary (Gibraltar), 
July 1937.  
23 Stockey, Dagger, pp. 202-205. 
24 Carlos Castilla del Pino, Pretérito Imperfecto (Barcelona: Tusquets, 2012), pp. 198-199. 
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Griffiths can be tested against corroborating evidence. What emerges is a picture of a man who 
did indeed hold significant power in the Campo de Gibraltar, who did indeed oversee mass 
executions in the area, and who enjoyed regular and cordial visits to officials and businessmen 
on The Rock as he did so. 
 
Who was Emilio Griffiths? 
 
Emilio Griffiths Navarro was born in 1890 in Jerez de la Frontera. It is possible that he lost 
both parents at a very early age. By the time he was eleven, Griffiths was living in Gibraltar 
with his grandmother, herself a widow and native of the town, then aged sixty. Several sources 
concur that Griffiths had at one stage had British nationality.25 Shortly after his eighteenth 
birthday in 1908, Griffiths moved to the neighbouring town of La Línea, where he would spend 
the next five years, among other things organising bullfights in the town.26 In October 1913, 
Griffiths moved to Madrid and within five months he had applied for a post in the police. 
Bureaucratic hurdles, not least confusion as to his nationality, held up the process of 
appointment, but Griffiths’ Spanish nationality was officially granted on 5 January 1915 and 
just a few days later he was appointed to the police force with an annual salary of 1500 pesetas.27 
Griffiths had joined the Cuerpo de Vigilancia in Madrid; a plain-clothes branch of the force, in 
which he would rise quickly, becoming an agent second-class within five years, and more than 
trebling his salary to 5000 pesetas by June 1921.28 As the equivalent of a detective, he was also 
licensed to carry a firearm.29  
 
                                                     
25 Details are taken from the Gibraltar census of 1901. Individual records can now be viewed online at 
http://www.nationalarchives.gi/gna/Default.aspx 
26 http://lalineaenblancoynegro.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/el-popular-bar-decano-autentico-baul-de.html 
[Accessed 12 November 2016 ] 
27 Gaceta de Madrid, 6 January 1915. 
28 Details on salary and career progression are taken from Archivo General del Ministerio del Interior 
(hereafter AGMI), Expediente personal de Emilio Griffiths Navarro (hereafter Expediente EG), Oficina 
de Director General de Seguridad. 
29 Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Madrid, 8 December 1922. 
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While living in the capital, Griffiths retained his interest in bulls, and he was mentioned as an 
‘aficionado’ in a Madrid periodical devoted to the spectacle in May 1926.30 It is possible that 
the interest was partly professional, since curiously, in addition to his job in the police, Griffiths 
was working as a ‘sub-delegate’ of veterinary medicine in the city.31 His combination of two 
public-sector posts was expressly forbidden by the rules of the Cuerpo de Vigilancia. 
Nonetheless, he sustained both posts throughout the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, though 
not without controversy. Griffiths was accused, for example, of regularly failing to pay his 
subscription to the Asociación Nacional de Veterinaria Española (National Spanish Veterinary 
Association), and more seriously of acting as a police informant against veterinary colleagues 
during a student strike in 1925. 32  Notwithstanding unpopularity within the veterinary 
profession, Griffiths was given a prestigious posting as veterinarian in the royal stables in 
1926.33 Combined with his police salary of 5000 pesetas, at a time when officers’ pay was a 
persistent cause of low morale in the force, Griffiths was doing well enough, by contrast, to 
buy himself a Renault car in the following year.34 His veterinary work for the king continued 
until the last days of the monarchy. In March 1930, for example, Griffiths travelled down to 
the site of his upbringing, Gibraltar, to take charge of seven special-breed horses, which 
Alfonso XIII had had shipped from Bombay to use in a polo match.35  By January 1931, 
Griffiths had been promoted to agent first-class in the police.36 
 
The arrival of the Spanish Second Republic on 14 April 1931 did not lead to a revolutionary 
shift in the state’s attitude to policing and public order, even though many republican politicians 
had themselves been subject to police investigation, incarceration or exile in the preceding 
                                                     
30 La Lidea (Madrid), 31 May 1926. 
31 ABC (Madrid) 29 March 1924; Boletín Oficial de la Provincia de Madrid, 7 April 1924. 
32 Griffiths’ disputes with fellow veterinarians can be followed through several issues of La Semana 
Veterinaria (Madrid), 24 January 1926; 21 February 1926; 28 February 1926; 25 December 1927; 27 
May 1928. 
33 La Lidea (Madrid), 31 May 1926. 
34 The salary is mentioned in Gaceta de Madrid, 24 May 1925. The car is registered in the periodical 
Madrid Automóvil, September 1927. On pay and conditions see José María Miguélez Rueda, 
‘Transformaciones y cambios en la policia española durante la II Republica’, Espacio, Tiempo y 
Forma, Series V, Vol. 10 (1997) pp. 205-222. 
35 La Vanguardia (Barcelona), 14 March 1930. El Telegrama del Rif (Melilla), 15 March 1930. 
36 AGMI, Expediente EG, Oficina de Director General de Seguridad. 
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years. Certainly, reforms were attempted by the new regime, but they were piecemeal.37 The 
force in which Griffiths served, the Cuerpo de Investigación, is a case in point. Under the 
monarchy and dictatorship, this body had been tasked not only with investigating crimes post 
facto, but also with investigation, surveillance and arrest of political ‘undesirables’. Certainly, 
this category had been applied to many republican politicians before 1931, but more broadly it 
covered prominent trade unionists, anarchists and ‘radical’ students. Griffiths’ work as 
informant during a strike of veterinary students in 1925 is thus illustrative of the corps’ modus 
operandi. Rather than attempt root-and-branch change, the first governments of the Republic 
saw the priority as addressing the relatively low pay of the force, and more broadly trying to 
instil ‘republican’ values within it. The Cuerpo de Investigación had the words ‘y Vigilancia’ 
added to its title, but its remit remained as it had under the previous regimes. That is to say, 
Griffiths and his colleagues spent much of their time investigating, surveilling and arresting 
political and social ‘undesirables’. For good measure, in 1934 the right-wing Radical-CEDA 
government revived the old Brigada de Barrios (Neighbourhoods Brigade) to act as a network 
of officers to gather intelligence and run informants on behalf of the Cuerpo.38 
 
The timidity of the Republic’s police reforms was perhaps a disappointment to many citizens 
who invested hope in the new regime, even before incidents such as Casas Viejas highlighted 
the extent to which the Spanish state still relied upon extreme violence in the face of public 
disturbance.39 Even members of the police force could be critical, however. In a reflective study 
published in exile in 1945, three former officers remarked: 
 
‘The Cuerpo de Investigación y Vigilancia on balance, save for a small number of officers 
recruited by the Republic, although not all of them, derived from the time of the Monarchy, and 
what is undoubtedly worse, the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera and its successor; a time in 
                                                     
37 Miguélez Rueda, ‘Transformaciones’, pp. 213-214. For a more critical reflection on the police and 
the Republican reform programme, see Manuel Risques Corbella, ‘Una reflexion sobre la policía 
durante la II República’, Revista Catalana de Seguretat Pública, no. 12 (2003), pp. 71-86. Much more 
sympathetic to the police under the Republic is Diego Palacios Cerezales, ‘Las voces de la policía 
durante la II República’, E-Prints Universidad Complutense de Madrid. 
http://eprints.ucm.es/8625/1/Polic%C3%ADa_república_v2.pdf  [Accessed 12 November 2016 ]. 
38 Miguélez Rueda, ‘Transformaciones’, pp. 213-222. 
39 For a revealing case study of ordinary citizens’ experiences of the police, see Chris Ealham, Class, 
Culture and Conflict in Barcelona 1898-1937 (London: Routledge, 2005), especially pp. 1-20, 132-
150. 
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which to be republican, to think as a republican was a crime […] the outlook of most of its 
officers was monarchist’.40 
 
Continuity of service from Dictatorship to Republic, and consequently a latent hostility to the 
new regime, was particularly marked in the upper echelons of the Cuerpo.41 It is therefore no 
surprise that Emilio Griffiths retained his post in the Madrid police force after April 1931. 
Indeed, Griffiths prospered, and under the Radical-CEDA administration was promoted to 
Inspector second-class in December 1934, with a salary of 7000 pesetas.42 According to the 
Marqués de Tamarón, José de Mora Figueroa, who was later astonished to see Griffiths 
assuming a prominent role in rebel Andalucía during the civil war, the inspector had also been 
a confidant and bodyguard of the Left Republican Santiago Casares Quiroga, Prime Minister 
in the weeks leading up to 18 July 1936.43 
 
 
Queipo’s man in the Campo 
 
Friendship with the former Prime Minister did not save Griffiths from dismissal within weeks 
of the outbreak of the civil war. The military coup brought about an immediate collapse of the 
Republican state apparatus, not least owing to understandable doubt over which state officials, 
civil servants, military officers, civil guards, policemen and so-forth had remained loyal. In 
areas where the coup failed, power had often passed into the hands of the dominant local 
political groups and workers’ militias. The ‘revenge’ that they enacted upon individuals 
suspected of taking part in the coup, sympathising with it, or simply standing as symbolic 
shorthand for perceived enemies of the Republic, was often brutal.44 In blood-soaked irony, and 
in direct contradiction to the claims of its propagandists, the coup had not saved Spain from 
                                                     
40 Quoted in Risques Corbella, ‘Una reflexión’, p. 86. 
41 Risques Corbella, ‘Una reflexión’, p. 86. 
42 AGMI, Expediente EG, Oficina de Director General de Seguridad. 
43 José de Mora Figueroa, Datos para la historia de la Falange gaditana, 1934-1939 (Jerez: Self 
Published, 1974), p. 26. 
44 José Luis Ledesma, ‘Una retaguardia al rojo: La violencia en la zona republicana’, in Francisco 
Espinosa (ed.), Violencia roja y azul, España 1939-1950 (Barcelona: Crítica, 2010), pp. 152-250. 
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imminent revolution, but had in fact precipitated violence in many of the areas where the 
military rebels were defeated. 
 
Faced with the uncertain loyalty of its functionaries, and pressed ‘from below’ for decisive 
action in defence of the Republic, it is not surprising that the government began a rapid and 
thorough reorganisation of the forces of ‘public order’. One historian of Republican Madrid has 
recently described the ‘purge’ of the capital’s police force, as if individuals were removed from 
posts, or even murdered, indiscriminately and vindictively. By this argument, the Republic 
wittingly or unwittingly allowed diehard revolutionaries to infiltrate the force and facilitate an 
easier and violent repression of perceived class enemies. This interpretation often pours scorn 
on the long-standing and visceral hatred of the police amongst large swathes of the population, 
particularly the urban working classes, for whom daily interaction with the forces of ‘law and 
order’ was inherently antagonistic and repressive. Similarly, whilst correctly recognising the 
fluidity and complexity of loyalties amongst the forces of law and order in response to the coup, 
it tends to play down the understandable suspicion that many citizens and officials loyal to the 
Republic had of the members of the security apparatus.45 As we have noted, even police officers 
under the Republic could be critical of the residual monarchism in the force, particularly in the 
higher echelons. The perception of an ‘unreformed’ Cuerpo and antagonism towards the 
Republic amongst its veterans might account for the relative violence meted out to its senior 
ranks in the summer of 1936. Julius Ruiz cites a post-war Francoist investigation, which listed 
229 policemen from the Cuerpo (30% of the pre-war force) as ‘murdered… during the red 
domination’ in Madrid. Of these, 171 came from the senior ranks.46 
 
Emilio Griffiths did not escape this purge. He was officially dismissed from the Cuerpo on 19 
August 1936, by which time he was already working openly for the military rebels in the 
Campo.47 Until the very last days of the Republic, Griffiths had ostensibly been working loyally 
                                                     
45 Julius Ruiz, The Red Terror and the Spanish Civil War: Revolutionary Violence in Madrid 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2014), pp. 9, 72-73, 81-105. 
46 Ruiz, Red Terror, p. 82. 
47 Frente Popular (San Sebastian), 20 August 1936. Accessed from 
http://www.gipuzkoa1936.com/dias.php?dia=20&imes=8&pag=3 [12 November 2016 ]. 
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for the regime. In late-June 1936, for example, José de Mora Figueroa had spotted Griffiths in 
Cádiz, where he had been sent at the behest of the Republican government to investigate a 
British vessel alleged to be carrying arms to Spanish military plotters.48 Griffiths spent at least 
some of the next two weeks conducting his investigation in Gibraltar and the Campo, and it is 
possible that this is where he became aware of preparations for a military coup.49 Certainly, he 
appears to have met Queipo de Llano in Algeciras on 10 July, where an indiscreet speech by 
the general to local carabineros (customs guards) gave some clue as to the impending military 
rising.50 Griffiths returned to Madrid and later gave a fantastical account of his escape from the 
capital in the first days of the civil war. Given the violence meted out to officers of the Cuerpo 
in Madrid, the decision to flee was understandable, but Griffiths’ rapid ascension to a position 
of authority in the rebel zone suggests that he had already committed himself to the coup some 
time ago.  
 
We cannot date Griffiths’ arrival in the Campo – not least because the local rebel hierarchy was 
never able to confirm the exact date – but he certainly arrived within the first ten days of August 
1936 and immediately began work as delegate to the military administration in the area.51 On 
21 August, Eduardo Valera Valverde, a retired Lieutenant Colonel recently appointed as Civil 
Governor for Cádiz province by Queipo de Llano, visited the Campo to inspect the local 
administration. It was reported that ‘he had particular praise’ for Griffiths, who was ‘carrying 
out his duties in a highly likeable and creditable manner’.52 One historian has claimed that 
Griffiths’ role was not formalised as Delegado Gubernativo (Government Delegate) until 26 
August, but he was already issuing orders under that authority as early as 16 August.53 When 
the appointment was finally announced across the border in Gibraltar over two weeks later, the 
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garrison newspaper remarked with a degree of pride that the new delegate was ‘well-known in 
Gibraltar’.54 
 
Multiple sources concur that Griffiths was appointed at the instigation of General Queipo de 
Llano, who was then de facto the rebel overlord in western Andalucía. Griffiths himself was 
sure to highlight the fact.55 His arrival in the Campo and subsequent elevation to Delegado 
Gubernativo both correspond neatly with two significant developments in the way the rebels 
administered the Campo. The first concerned the use of the Gibraltar-Spain frontier. Already 
on 8 August, the rebel authorities had ordered the closure of the frontier on the pretext that the 
colony was being used ‘by Communists for supplying information etc. to the communist 
Government forces’. Panicked by the prospect of losing access to Spanish workers, not to 
mention supplies of fresh food and water from Spain, the Gibraltar authorities had immediately 
sought to placate the new masters of the Campo. That same day, the Colonial Secretary of 
Gibraltar travelled to Algeciras to propose a new identity card system for Spanish workers on 
the Rock. This would allow the rebel Spanish authorities to monitor the allocation of (British) 
work permits and prevent ‘undesirables’ from securing employment in the colony. 56  The 
frontier was duly reopened, but on 19 August, Queipo de Llano issued an edict which prohibited 
the exportation of capital from Spain, and more broadly any attempt to carry ‘contraband’ 
across the border. Those caught committing this ‘crime’ would be ‘pasados por las armas’ – a 
euphemism for being shot.57 On 30 October, Queipo issued a similar edict, this time aimed 
specifically at residents of the Campo de Gibraltar. The prohibition on the carriage of silver 
and gold currency across the frontier was restated. As an additional measure, Spanish workers 
in Gibraltar were now compelled to change their wages, paid in sterling, into Spanish currency 
at a rate of forty pesetas to the pound.58 A comparable rate of exchange in Gibraltar would have 
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been eighty pesetas to the pound. The edict was a good example of what Rúben Serém has 
referred to as Queipo’s ‘kleptocratic state’ – in this case a means to extort money from ordinary 
citizens on behalf of the rebel war effort.59 Spanish workers were also forced to pay a small tax 
to have their permits renewed.60 
 
The edict of 30 October also clarified the role and authority of Emilio Griffiths in this regard. 
Griffiths was given sole authority to issue permits for those wishing to cross from Spain to 
Gibraltar, including the approval of (Spanish) work permits for the Rock. Anybody caught 
attempting to circumvent the prohibition against export of capital would at the very least have 
their permit revoked, in addition to ‘the corresponding penalty’. Queipo’s edict reminded 
residents of the Campo of ‘the necessity, for the good of the Patria, to ease the work of my 
Delegate for civil matters in the Campo and I warn that he will take the most energetic measures 
against those who, in any manner whatsoever, make that work more difficult’.61 To judge by 
the available evidence, Griffiths had long since been overseeing ‘the most energetic measures’ 
against local residents. The second development in the administration of the Campo that 
corresponds to Griffiths’ arrival in early-August concerns the repression unleashed by the 
rebels. 
 
The Campo de Gibraltar had fallen very quickly to rebel forces after the coup. Confusion 
reigned in the area after news of an army uprising in Morocco first came through on 17 July. 
Politically, the region was staunchly republican, and candidates of the Popular Front parties 
had won comfortably in each municipality bordering Gibraltar in the February elections that 
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year.62 The respective civilian representatives worked hard to organise units of the military, 
carabineros and Guardia Civil in response to the news of the coup, but they were hampered by 
the prevarication of local military commanders.63 The matter was solved quickly and decisively 
by the arrival of Moroccan units in Algeciras from across the Strait on 18 July. Algeciras fell 
that same afternoon, with La Línea largely occupied by the evening of 19 July.64 Los Barrios 
fell on 23 July. San Roque did see an attempted Republican counterattack on 27 July by 
anarchist militiamen from Málaga, but it was quickly repulsed. In their brief stay, the anarchists 
had killed six local rightists, including the man named as mayor by the rebels, José Sánchez 
Velasco. The intervention of local republicans had prevented further executions, but this did 
not stop the rebels unleashing terrible reprisals against captured anarchist militiamen as well as 
suspected ‘leftist’ residents of San Roque.65   
 
As with so much of Spain, there is still much that we do not know about the number and location 
of victims of rebel executions in the Campo de Gibraltar. Some earlier estimates clearly seem 
to have been exaggerated. San Roque resident Carlos Castilla del Pino, for example, suggested 
a figure of 2000 for La Línea alone, with ‘some 200 women (daughters, wives of prisoners or 
of those executed) […] shot in the course of two or three days in La Línea, San Roque, Algeciras 
and Los Barrios’ in October 1936.66 The tireless work of local historians, archaeologists and 
members of ‘memory’ associations has afforded us a much more accurate picture of Francoist 
repression in the Campo. Based largely on civil registers of deaths in the municipalities 
immediately adjacent to Gibraltar – Algeciras, Los Barrios, La Línea and San Roque - and 
cross-referenced where possible with information in registers of burials, a minimum figure of 
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411 executions has been compiled.67 San Roque suffered at least 100 victims that we know of, 
from a population of around 10,610. In Algeciras, experts have offered a minimum figure of 
131 victims from a population of 21,341. One study estimates between 350 and 500 victims in 
the city.68 Various methodological problems plague attempts to be more exact.69 In Algeciras, 
for example, Luis Alberto del Castillo found that widows were paid 25 pesetas to attest in the 
official death registers that their husbands had succumbed to heart attacks, starvation and other 
natural causes. He was further hindered by the fact that the civil register in the city ceased to 
record deaths during the civil war after 22 August 1937.70  
 
The largest urban settlement in the Campo in 1936 was La Línea.71 Here an estimate of at least 
150 executions had been offered, of whom at least 148 have been identified through registers 
of burials in the local cemetery. If we allow for the very real possibility of victims lying 
unburied, and thus unregistered, within the municipal boundaries, the true figure is likely to be 
higher. A single and immediate bloodletting was recorded on 21 July, when 26 burials were 
registered in the town. No further executions were recorded in the register until 10 August, 
almost three weeks later, although a group of Spaniards trying to cross the border into Gibraltar 
were shot at on 29 July, three of whom were killed.72 Even if we accept the minimum estimate 
of 411 executions in the four municipalities closest to Gibraltar, this would represent 13.4% of 
the total confirmed executions in the province of Cádiz during the civil war.73 This is all the 
more extraordinary if we consider that up to 10,000 inhabitants of the Campo were able to cross 
the frontier into Gibraltar before the arrival of rebel troops.74 Many hundreds more were able 
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to flee towards Málaga.75 In both cases, those most likely to flee were those most likely to face 
rebel ‘justice’. By contrast, the rebels’ own post-war investigations recorded just six individuals 
killed by the ‘reds’, all of whom died in San Roque, as mentioned above.76  
 
Given what historians have long-since known about other parts of Spain, the fact that the 
inhabitants (and soldiers) of the Campo offered minimal resistance to the military coup does 
not make the subsequent scale of rebel executions particularly surprising.77 Indeed, for moral 
and ‘patriotic’, as much as for political and ideological reasons, the inhabitants of the Campo 
were viewed with disdain by the new occupying forces. Not only were they deemed suspect by 
a long tradition of anarchism, republicanism and anticlericalism in the area, but they were also 
deemed guilty by association of their economic dependence upon the national ‘shame’ of 
Gibraltar. In other words, the local working classes were viewed largely as smugglers and 
prostitutes.78 The proliferation of masonic lodges in the Campo – also blamed upon proximity 
to Gibraltar – did not help either. One Francoist report of 1936 described La Línea as: 
 
‘A town whose council was entirely masonic, a Chamber of Commerce where all its members 
and symbolism were masonic, and a Mercantile Club which in its bosom harboured all the 
scattered amalgam, nine masonic lodges established strategically throughout the city, more than 
thirty extremist centres plotting with impunity. And to counteract all of these monstrosities, just 
one small Church with capacity for 150 or 200 people, a single small club where half a dozen 
decent people met […] Not once did the parties of the right win elections, and in the last they 
received just 800 votes, costing more than 20,000 pesetas […]’79 
 
In addition to mass executions, mass incarceration of civilians proceeded apace in the Campo 
in the first weeks of the civil war. As of 8 August, the day when the rebels first closed the 
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Gibraltar frontier, 280 Spaniards employed in the naval dockyard on the Rock had failed to 
appear for work.80 Notwithstanding its masonic symbolism, the rebels had converted the town’s 
Circulo Mercantíl into a makeshift detention and torture centre.81 And despite question marks 
over the testimony of Abraham Bensusan, the almost-flippant reasons he cites the rebels using 
to justify arrests of civilians in the Campo are perfectly consistent with other documentary 
sources. One Gibraltarian named Juan Villa was arrested by the rebels on 7 December 1936, 
for example, and sentenced to 21 days in prison for saying ‘Franco will never take Madrid’ in 
a café in La Línea.82 The fiercely pro-rebel British Vice-Consul of La Línea, a Gibraltarian 
businessman named Joseph Patron, rather optimistically suggested that a Spaniard would have 
received a sentence of ‘six months trench digging’ for a similar remark.83 In May 1937, a 
Spanish dockyard worker named Manuel Jurado was arrested in La Línea because he ‘appeared 
pleased’ when hearing about rebel setbacks at the front. He was sentenced at first to execution, 
but after intercession from the Gibraltar authorities the sentence was commuted. By this point, 
even another fiercely pro-Franco British official, the Admiral in command of naval forces at 
Gibraltar, James Pipon, demanded that something be done to encourage leniency with such 
‘absurdly trivial’ offences.84 He was to be disappointed. 
 
If executions in La Línea were temporarily halted after 21 July 1936, they resumed and became 
regular after 10 August, that is to say at the same time as Emilio Griffiths arrived in the Campo 
with the blessing of General Queipo de Llano. Three executions were listed in the register of 
burials on 10 August, four on the following day, and then eight on both the 15 and 16 August 
respectively. On 20 August, the day before the Civil Governor of Cádiz visited the Campo and 
praised the work of Griffiths, six further executions were registered, with five more on the day 
that the visit was publicised in the rebel press on 22 August. Also heavily implicated in the 
executions was Servando Casas, a retired army doctor and Falangist, who was named mayor of 
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La Línea on 26 August. Coming just a few days after his arrival, it is inconceivable that Griffiths 
did not approve the appointment.85 Indeed, on 12 September Griffiths issued a decree, backed 
by the authority of Queipo, demanding that all local civilian officials had to report to his office 
within ten days to have their posts confirmed.86  
 
Within the emerging rebel hierarchy in the area, this new edict was clearly a show of strength, 
but it also served a second purpose. The decree provided a veneer of legitimacy for Griffiths to 
forcefully expropriate the property of those republicans ‘absent’ from their posts, either because 
they had taken a sensible decision to flee the region in the face of the military coup, or else had 
‘disappeared’ in its wake. On the same day as the edict, ‘24 farms’ belonging to Antonio 
Galiardo Linares, a former republican mayor of San Roque, were expropriated and registered 
in the name of the Junta de Defensa Nacional de Burgos.87 That is to say, they were stolen and 
‘donated’ to the rebel war effort in absentia. Galiardo was a moderate member of the Izquierda 
Republicana party of the Spanish President Manuel Azaña, a freemason and a lawyer by trade, 
who had managed to evade capture in July.88 He was described in the rebel press, by contrast, 
as a ‘renowned Marxist and resident of San Roque’ in order to justify the expropriation.89 
Meanwhile, the rebels conducted a further twelve executions in La Línea that day. 
 
By the time that Abraham Bensusan wrote his first letter, a minimum of 102 people had been 
executed by the rebels in La Línea, 76 of these since Griffiths’ arrival. The report in the 
Gibraltar Chronicle to which Bensusan referred in his second letter claimed that seven people 
had been executed in La Línea, including two women and two Spanish grocers who had 
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businesses on The Rock.90 The Chronicle was not immune to sensationalising news from across 
the border, but in this case its report, and the testimony of Bensusan, matches the registered 
burials in La Línea following executions on 15 November. The following day, a right-wing 
Spanish refugee in Gibraltar, Carlos Crooke-Larios, was beaten and stabbed by at least three 
men ‘for signing the execution papers’, including those of a small girl.91 With tragic regularity, 
the executions would continue throughout the winter in La Línea. A sharp increase in killings 
followed the fall of Málaga in February 1937, with 35 recorded that month, before registers of 
burials ceased in La Línea for the duration of the civil war on 24 February 1937. As in 
neighbouring Algeciras, where records end on 22 August 1937, the absence of registers of 
deaths and burials should not lead us to conclude that executions in the Campo had now ceased. 
 
It is understandable that executions behind the lines, in both the Republican and the Rebel 
zones, have attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in recent decades, not to mention fierce 
controversy as part of Spain’s ‘memory wars’ since the mid-1990s.92 But historians have long 
since understood repression to cover much more than the act of killing, and once again the 
Campo de Gibraltar is no different.93 Here, as elsewhere, Francoist repression aimed not only 
to eliminate or punish political and ideological opponents, and subjugate the remaining 
population into quiescence. The aim was also to reverse, both practically and symbolically, the 
reforms of the Spanish Second Republic and the discourse of rights and justice that underpinned 
them; ‘killing change’, as Helen Graham has described it. From the start, the military rebels 
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also encouraged civilian participation in the repression, binding citizens to the emerging regime 
in a ‘pact of blood’.94 
 
Physical punishments and the invasion of private space were commonplace, and were quickly 
made the work of local civilians as well as local military units. One resident of La Línea recalled 
how a local rightist, Alfonso Cruz Herrera, proceeded from house to house with a bayonet in 
his hand to conduct searches.95 Women, in particular, were open to intimidation, rape and 
physical humiliation. One woman caught returning from Gibraltar with bread concealed in her 
clothes explained that she had done so because her children were hungry. A Falangist present 
at the frontier search took her to the Circulo Mercantíl and served her two fried eggs, before 
administering a purgative, having her head shaved and making her parade through the street. 
Isabel Álvarez, another eyewitness from La Línea, recalls that this treatment of women at the 
Círculo and public humiliation in the adjacent Calle Real was frequent.96 Physical searches at 
the frontier gave officials every opportunity to sexually harass women passing to and from 
Gibraltar, and those caught with contraband were particularly open to sexual abuse in exchange 
for turning a blind eye.97 Meanwhile, young Falangists sang proudly as they paraded down the 
Calle Real in La Línea: ‘By the authority/And by the order of the mayor/We’re going to give 
you a purgative/And shave off your hair!’ Other songs boasted about raping widows.98 
 
Fear of execution, incarceration or physical violence were exacerbated by the control that the 
rebels now exercised over the Gibraltar frontier. We have already noted the edicts of Queipo in 
this regard and the role of Griffiths’ in enforcing them. In a region that was already infamous 
as one of the poorest in Spain, and now witnessing thousands of families deprived of their 
principal breadwinner through execution or forced exile, the threat of losing permission to cross 
into Gibraltar for work, and perhaps to augment income through recourse to smuggling, was 
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potentially catastrophic for those left behind. In this way, economic desperation served as a 
further means of ensuring civilian acquiescence. As in Queipo’s Seville, poverty was in no 
small part welcomed for this very purpose. Not only did it instil fear, but it also forced the 
remaining republican families into the care of the relief organisations being set up by the 
emerging Francoist state, such as the Falange’s Sección Femenina or the Auxilio Social.99 
Charity came at the price of conformity. One republican couple that returned to La Línea after 
the civil war were refused a milk ration for their child by Auxilio Social, on the grounds that 
they had not been married in a Catholic Church. To feed their child, they reluctantly had to ‘re’-
marry and have the child baptised.100 
 
One further aim of the repression, which was pioneered in the territory held by Queipo and 
quickly mimicked throughout the rebel zone, was to sustain the rebel war effort economically 
through theft, intimidation and extortion. Expropriation of property belonging to executed 
republicans and those in exile added to the coffers of the emerging Francoist state, in the same 
way that the looting of bodies and houses often filled the pockets of individual rebel 
executioners.101  We have already noted Griffiths’ confiscation of the properties of the mayor 
of San Roque above. The ‘kleptocratic state’ did not just target its perceived enemies, however, 
but also its nominal supporters. There is absolutely no reason to doubt that many people gave 
money and goods enthusiastically in support of the rebel cause after 18 July 1936, but as Serém 
had demonstrated amply for Queipo’s Seville, ‘donations’, even from groups and individuals 
supportive of the rebellion, were often nothing of the sort.102 To this we can add that thousands 
of previously staunch republicans who felt that donation was the better part of valour in proving 
their credentials to the new authorities, and thus avoiding arrest or execution. Similarly, it has 
long been known that thousands joined the Falange in the hope that the blue shirt would act as 
‘life jacket’.103 The brother of Francisca Aguilar of La Línea was advised to do just this in the 
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summer of 1936, but opted instead to flee to Tangier. Many others in the town chose the blue 
shirt.104 
 
In the Campo de Gibraltar, Emilio Griffiths proved himself to be an extremely capable 
administrator of Queipo’s ‘kleptocratic state’ in the South. In April 1937, one Republican 
newspaper published a long piece about life in the Campo. Describing economic destitution, 
the report claimed that theft was widespread, including burglaries of houses belonging to 
foreigners, and even thefts committed against ‘notorious fascist shopkeepers’ and several local 
businessmen. The perpetrators were said to be family members of the local civilian hierarchy, 
but their actions ‘covered up so as to avoid a scandal’. Meanwhile, ‘Falangists, Requetés, Civil 
Guards and officials […] get drunk in bars and don’t pay […] in the brothels they beat and rob 
the wretches’. The article spoke of ‘corruption at every level’, with chauffeurs selling petrol 
and car parts on the black market, and officials allowing the passage of money, tobacco and 
other articles across the frontier to line their own pockets. Widespread rape was also alleged, 
with perpetrators said to be killing victims to cover up the crime. Singled out at the end of this 
litany of accusations was Emilio Griffiths: 
 
‘A man of very shady conduct […] as Delegate it is under his authority to stop all these scandals. 
This said man, not only has not put an end to such abuses, but is making the most of them and 
living the good life, at the expense of those others he sends out to steal’.105 
 
A similar charge sheet had been compiled by another Republican newspaper, Democracia, a 
month earlier. This time Griffiths, ‘the buddy of Queipo’ (compadre) was alleged to be working 
alongside Captain Fernández Sánchez, the Chief of the Falange in La Línea, and a local cacique 
from Campamento, Lieutenant Justo López. All three were accused of overseeing mass 
executions in the Campo with a group of ‘twenty five scoundrels’ performing the killings. 
Moreover, they were engaged in ‘robberies, lootings and violent expropriations from the local 
population’. So bad had the situation become that some elements of the local hierarchy had 
arrested one of their collaborators, another member of the Falange, Lieutenant Carlos Calvo 
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Chozas. Collectively, the newspaper claimed they had committed ‘more than ninety murders 
with the exclusive object of looting the houses of the victims’. Having forced Calvo to confess, 
it was reported that Justo López had been arrested and taken to prison in Algeciras.106 
 
Manifestly, both reports were pieces of propaganda. Nonetheless, we can compare such pen 
pictures with what we know from other sources about life in the Campo under Griffiths’ watch. 
Francisca Aguilar recalls that ‘they robbed everything’ from her uncle at the start of the civil 
war, who later died ‘in disgust’ at the way he had been treated. She also spoke of Falangists 
stealing indiscriminately from the people of La Línea and keeping a house ‘full of everything 
they had taken from others’. Aguilar went so far as to name José Pérez Ponce, who later went 
on to be mayor of the town, as one such thief.107 Maruja Gil, another resident of La Línea, 
recalled that the Moroccan troops who occupied the town after 19 July were ‘looting everything 
they found in their path […] they took almost everything from us’.108 We know from the 
Falange’s own newspapers that a month after Griffiths’ arrival in the Campo, members of the 
Military Command in Algeciras travelled in person to see Queipo in Seville and hand over 8 
kilogrammes of gold as a ‘contribution’ from the local population. This was an impressive 
donation to the rebels’ cause, given that the parties of the right in the Campo had struggled to 
secure even 10% of the vote in the elections of February that year.109  
 
More conclusively, one of the few extant documentary records of Emilio Griffiths’ tenure as 
Delegado Gubernativo supports many of the charges made in the two newspaper stories quoted 
above. In November 1936, the High Commander of the Francoist Police launched an 
investigation into Griffiths’ conduct in the Campo following a series of official complaints 
against him by members of the local Francoist hierarchy. The investigating judge in the case 
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collected 14 written depositions from police officers in Cádiz, Algeciras, La Línea and Ronda, 
as well as further depositions from four military officers in the Campo and a carabinero serving 
on the Gibraltar frontier. Given that most of the witnesses had direct or indirect involvement in 
the savage Francoist repression in the Campo, their collective assessment that Griffiths’ 
conduct was ‘irregular and licentious’ and ‘creating a situation of disharmony’ in the region 
was telling. Amongst a litany of accusations, Griffiths was denounced for ordering police 
officers to find women ‘for his carnal enlargement’ and for blackmailing at least two young 
women for sexual favours in return for guarantees for the safety of loved ones. The delegado 
was reported to be ordering the arrest of individuals in the Campo for ‘the sole aim of settling 
scores or desires of a personal nature’, but he also stood accused of intimidating local Francoist 
officials by ordering gratuitous searches of their houses and threatening them too with arrest. 
Finally, several witnesses claimed that Griffiths was engaged in shady financial conduct. 
Following the rebel capture of Castellar de la Frontera, for example, Griffiths allegedly 
confiscated a large herd of cattle and placed it at the discretion of a ‘Delegation of Agrarian 
Reform’ that he had created in La Línea, from where at least fifty cattle disappeared ‘to 
destination unknown’ and were later found on the property of one of Griffiths’ friends.110  
 
Griffiths also raised eyebrows more than once for bullying and abusing officials and customs 
guards on the Gibraltar frontier. On 30 September 1936, for example, when travelling to 
Gibraltar with a resident of San Roque, Griffiths was asked to get out of his car at the frontier 
by a carabinero, who explained that the frontier was closed on the Spanish side by military 
order. According to one witness ‘Griffiths responded that he had to comply with urgency with 
an order received moments before by telephone from […] Queipo de Llano’. The guard having 
let him pass, Griffiths returned some time later from Gibraltar with his friend from San Roque 
and proceeded to the La Línea Police station, where he unleashed a torrent of abuse about the 
‘shameless scum’ who made up the local police force.111  
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The authority and confidence placed in Griffiths by Queipo was supposed to spare him the need 
to answer to anybody in the local Francoist hierarchy, save for the Military Governor of the 
Campo. Quite possibly, friendship with Queipo spared Griffiths any repercussions from the 
investigation launched against him in November 1936. Despite ample and compelling 
testimony, no charges were raised against Griffiths once the National Chief of (Francoist) 
Police received the final reports on the case on 27 January 1937.112 Griffiths continued to act in 
Queipo’s name for some time and was not shy in advertising the fact, even if this, as much as 
his ensuing conduct, earned him enemies within the local Francoist hierarchy.  
 
Arrest and death 
 
On 6 May 1937, Emilio Griffiths was arrested in La Línea. The story made the New York Times, 
where it was suggested that the arrest was made ‘following orders from Salamanca’.113 The 
newspaper went further on the following day and reported that various Gibraltarians had 
received ‘confidential information’ not to cross the frontier, where they faced arrest. A number 
of other arrests were also reported, including the mayor of San Roque, a lawyer, a photographer 
and a civil judge from La Línea. The reason given was ‘to discourage the border traffic and to 
tighten up Insurgent censorship’.114 The Republican press gleefully picked up the story, quoting 
a report posted from Gibraltar by Daily Herald correspondent Stephen Wall. The journalist had 
form in exaggerating his reports from Gibraltar, and this time was no different.115 Wall’s report 
had Griffiths being taken directly to Salamanca, with accusations of trafficking large amounts 
of currency, from which he had made large profits. Queipo de Llano was also thought to be 
implicated. Wall claimed that Griffiths had been arrested whilst in bed by ‘the personal guard 
of Franco’. Griffiths had shouted ‘Get out! You can’t arrest me’ and struck the captain who had 
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brought the arrest warrant. The report also claimed that Griffiths had sent for help to the offices 
of the local Falange, but that nobody had been willing to intervene, given that Griffiths’ illegal 
activities were notorious.116 
 
The available sources are contradictory, but Griffiths was in fact most likely taken to prison in 
Seville. On 25 June 1937, the Gibraltar Chronicle reported that Griffiths had been killed as a 
result of a ‘fall’ from a fifth storey window of a ‘military building in Seville […] in an attempt 
to escape arrest’.117 Accounts of Griffiths’ incarceration and death are also contradictory. The 
leading military plotter in Seville before the civil war, Major José Cuesta Monereo, claimed 
that Griffiths had been taken to the Comandancia de Marina building. By contrast, José de Mora 
Figueroa has Griffiths taken to the Parque Maria Luisa in Seville, which had been set up as a 
temporary prison at the start of the civil war. Cuesta has Griffiths being arrested on Good Friday 
(26 March) in the streets of Seville, nearly six weeks before the arrest was actually made, and 
in the wrong place. Mora Figueroa has Griffiths arrested in July 1937 in Algeciras, which is 
long after his death was reported.118 We also know that Griffiths was buried in the San Fernando 
cemetery in Seville on 28 June.119 Where the two sources coincide is in stating that Griffiths 
committed suicide. Both men are also quite clear that the arrest was the result of Griffiths being 
discovered to be a British spy, an accusation resurrected in the 1960s by the Francoist court 
historian, Ricardo de la Cierva.120 
 
Suspicion was seemingly aroused by the fact that Griffiths had such easy access to Gibraltar, 
including to key officials. It will be recalled that Bensusan reported Griffiths talking to William 
Gulloch, Gibraltar’s Chief of Police, just hours after he had supposedly overseen a round of 
executions in La Línea. Huart described Griffiths visiting the Rock ‘almost daily’. Meanwhile, 
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Mora Figueroa ‘knew through trustworthy sources that he was going into Gibraltar how and 
when he liked […] at the same time he had contact with red Spanish refugees’.121 Certainly 
Griffiths paid regular visits to Gibraltar and seems to have held the respect of its colonial 
hierarchy. Shortly after Griffiths’ arrest, the Colonial Secretary lamented that ‘the delegate in 
La Linea who has been most helpful in recent months has just been removed from his post, and 
replaced by authorities who are not nearly so courteous or obliging’.122 On more than one 
occasion Griffiths was given space in the Gibraltar Chronicle to offer ‘news’ from the other 
side of the frontier. On 3 February 1937, for example, Griffiths reported that the rebels had 
impounded a Spanish motorboat, before going on to encourage residents of the colony to visit 
the Campo. ‘Gibraltar residents were daily visiting the neighbourhood by motor-car,’ he 
claimed, ‘while others went to play polo and golf […] There were a large number of British 
and other foreign residents living in La Linea and adjacent Spanish towns, where complete 
tranquillity prevailed’.123 The following day, at least four people were executed in La Línea. 
 
Many years later, the British intelligence services on the Rock offered their own explanation 
for what had happened to Griffiths. They singled out a Spaniard called José García Sánchez as 
responsible for denouncing Griffiths to the rebel authorities. García Sánchez had been a 
pronounced rightist, who had ‘changed his sympathies’ when the Second Republic was 
declared in 1931. He had attempted to join a masonic lodge and been refused, and so began to 
keep photographs of masonic meetings which he later used in the civil war to denounce 
individual freemasons to the rebel forces. García Sánchez was also very friendly with Griffiths 
at the start of the civil war and worked as his secretary in La Línea. Things turned awry when 
García Sánchez had tried to implicate Griffiths as a British spy, and the latter had ordered 
García Sánchez to be sent to a concentration camp for four months. Upon his release, García 
Sánchez ‘did his best to ruin Griffin [sic]’ and shortly afterwards Griffiths was arrested and 
taken to Seville. This report added that García Sánchez had been helped by Manuel Fernández 
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Jiménez in the plot to unseat Griffiths.124 Fernández Jiménez went on to become a high ranking 
and ‘staunchly anti—British’ member of Spanish intelligence in the Second World War. During 
the civil war, he earned the nickname ‘agenta poliglota’ (multilingual agent) in rebel Seville, 
and specialised in rooting out leftists who had enrolled in the Falange and the Spanish Foreign 
Legion in the city to evade arrest. He also worked periodically in Gibraltar as a spy for the 
rebels.125 If there was any record of Griffiths actually working for the British, the operative in 
Gibraltar who wrote the report on his demise was giving nothing away. 
 
There is one further plausible reason for the arrest of Griffiths, even if the source of the 
information is deeply problematic. Five days after Griffiths’ death, the anarchist newspaper 
Solidaridad Obrera published a long and blithesome piece on the subject. The newspaper 
placed Griffiths ‘in that class of adventurers around Europe who make money out of war’, and 
described him as ‘a great expert in questions of banking and the stock market’. It alleged that 
Griffiths was using his contacts to move back and forth into Gibraltar at whim, as well as to 
London, in order to ‘hide money in foreign banks’ for his master Queipo de Llano. When 
Griffiths expanded his operations to ‘do the same for rich Andalucians to save them money 
from the financial rules of Queipo’, he was discovered. Solidaridad Obrera claimed that 
although Queipo had been forced to order the arrest, he was keenly aware that Griffiths ‘knew 
all his secrets’. In jail, Griffiths first pleaded with Queipo to secure his release, before turning 
to threats that he would denounce Queipo ‘first to Franco, then to the world’. The newspaper 
conceded that Griffiths’ fall from a fifth storey window  ‘could have been’ a suicide, but 
questioned whether ‘it is inside the realms of possibility also that it was a crime, a murder 
committed to disappear someone who knew how much money Queipo had made in these 
ways?’126 Years later, even Cuesta was forced to ask the rhetorical question ‘what secrets might 
have been uncovered, which died with this suicide?’127 
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Queipo has recently been painted as something of an economic pioneer for the rebel war effort, 
not least due to his early and stringent imposition of currency controls and his ability to raise 
‘donations’.128 Serém’s picture of a ‘kleptocratic state’ is much more convincing. But one does 
not have to be convinced by Solidaridad Obrera to advance the thesis that individuals stood to 
gain personally from the systematic theft, extortion and intimidation in the rebel zone. We have 
noted above how the ‘kleptocratic state’ worked in practice in the Campo de Gibraltar, and the 
allegations made against Griffiths and others for making personal gain from the situation. The 
Campo also offered a singular opportunity for corruption in the form of the frontier with 
Gibraltar, and the truly industrial smuggling trade that it had facilitated for well over a century. 
Corruption amongst carabineros and local officials was infamous.129 Queipo de Llano’s last 
post under the Republic had been as head of the Cuerpo de Carabineros, a position that had 
brought him more than once to inspect arrangements around Gibraltar. More than most, 
therefore, Queipo must have been aware of the opportunities for exploiting the contraband 
traffic at the Gibraltar frontier. In this light, it is at least possible that Queipo’s edicts in relation 
to the carriage of currency over the frontier, and the forced exchange of pounds for pesetas at 
half their worth, were motivated by thoughts other than the health of the rebels’ wartime 
economy. Mora Figueroa unwittingly confirmed one of the allegations of Solidaridad Obrera 
by stating that Griffiths was known to be ‘trafficking in foreign exchange’ before his arrest.130 
For his part, Queipo obtained a reputation in the Campo as a shameless smuggler. Vicente 
Ricardo Badillo, a resident of La Línea, recalled that the general was ‘known as much for 
smuggling as for military skill’. He further recalled a visit of Queipo to La Línea several years 
later, where the general: 
 
‘[…] made a very long list of goods for his chauffeur: penicillin, brandy, spark plugs […] he 
found them all [in Gibraltar] and packed them in the car. At the customs post they gave him the 
military salute and he took them all back to Seville’.131 
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One named victim of rebel violence in the Campo was the chemist Evaristo Rámos Cadenas, 
executed by the rebels in August 1936. This may have been because Evaristo was a freemason, 
or perhaps because he was known to offer free treatments to the poorest residents of the town. 
It may also have been simple revenge. Months before the Civil War, Evaristo had remonstrated 
with an embarrassed Queipo de Llano, then head of the carabineros, because he objected to 
dogs loaded with contraband from Gibraltar crossing over his property on their way to handlers 
in La Línea. Queipo had seemed strangely reluctant to order his officers to stop the practice.132 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
On 19 December 1937, the Republican edition of ABC reported the death of Emilio Griffiths, 
almost six months after the fact. At the same time, it stated that his ‘former associates’ had been 
rounded up by the rebel authorities. Emilio Villar, a Falangist, had been condemned to 13 years 
in prison; the Delegate of Propaganda and Press in Algeicras received almost 15 years. Eighteen 
‘other fascists of secondary order’ were also arrested, and another local Falangist captain had 
been ‘disappeared’. 133 The purging of Griffiths’ ‘network’ is confirmed by other sources, but 
probably took place much earlier.134  
 
The chaos caused within the local rebel hierarchy by the exposure of Griffiths – whether as spy, 
thief or smuggler – highlights the fact that the rebel coalition had its own tensions, rivalries and 
rifts. Griffiths was, in effect, exposed by members of his own side for something terrible enough 
to warrant imprisonment and death. When the time came for his arrest, nobody in the rebel-
held Campo was prepared to come to his aid. Similarly, at a higher level, one does not need to 
determine whether Griffiths was arrested by Queipo’s men, or by men sent by Franco himself 
from Salamanca. To paraphrase George Orwell, Griffiths was assuredly Queipo’s man, even 
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though Solidaridad Obrera said he was. Implicated or not in Griffiths’ activities, the arrest 
would have been a profound embarrassment to Queipo, and doubtless a source of mirth for 
Franco as he strove to exert total authority over the rebel coalition. The forced unification of 
the various political forces in rebel Spain had only taken place on 19 April 1937, just over a 
fortnight before Griffiths’ arrest.135 
 
Similarly, we do not need to prove that Queipo was involved in the activities leading to 
Griffiths’ arrest, in order to conclude that Griffiths’ tenure in the Campo de Gibraltar represents 
a perfect example of the ‘kleptocratic state’ that Queipo had built in the South. Theft, 
expropriation and intimidation in the Campo were widespread, while Queipo and Griffiths were 
able to use control of the Gibraltar frontier to raise levies against Spanish workers in Gibraltar, 
and to force them to exchange currency at half its worth. Given what we know of Queipo’s 
‘donations’ elsewhere, it is not at all surprising that allegations were made that local businesses 
and even rebel sympathisers in the Campo were the subject of robberies. With or without 
Queipo’s new frontier restrictions, there is also no doubt whatsoever that mass smuggling still 
took place across the Gibraltar frontier during the civil war. Despite their own professions of 
impartiality, and despite the presence of observers for the international Non Intervention 
Scheme, the British authorities at Gibraltar were fully aware of this. They were also aware of 
the scale of executions taking place across the frontier.136 Rather than suffer moral qualms at 
the prospect of dealing daily with the man overseeing this panorama of terror and grift, they 
seemed genuinely sad to see Emilio Griffiths go.  
 
Finally, therefore, Griffiths’ story offers a window into an all-too-familiar case study of 
Francoist ‘justice’ in the South. Like most regions falling to the rebels in those first months of 
the civil war, the people of the Campo suffered brutal repression. This went far beyond the 411 
people executed, at a minimum, in the four municipalities closest to Gibraltar, and extended to 
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mass incarceration, torture, physical punishment and intimidation, sexual harassment and rape, 
and exile for thousands who were able to escape. After the war, the region hosted mass 
battalions of republican forced labourers.137 As in other areas of Francoist Spain, public space 
was dramatically refashioned to extirpate all signs of the Republican period and glorify the new 
regime. Crosses to the ‘Nationalist’ fallen were erected in prominent spaces in each town, while 
most of those republicans registered as buried in local cemeteries were interred in mass and 
unmarked graves.  Many more were simply described as ‘disappeared’, their loved ones 
keeping their memories alive during the four decades of dictatorship with photographs and 
other small mementoes to prove that they had lived.138 In recent years the work of historians, 
archaeologists and civilian ‘memory’ associations has done much to offer some form of 
memorial to their lives and deaths. Ironically, Emilio Griffiths Navarro appears in one such list, 
as a victim of Francoist violence in the Campo.139 
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